A standard model of frictional labor market of Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching, works on the assumption that the underlying productivity process for generating output is known to workers and firms alike. The implications that workers should not make systematic errors about their perception of labor market outcomes, however, have been challenged by recent survey evidence. In this paper, using a search and matching framework, I analyse heterogeneous firms\' responses when faced with workers that are unaware of the productivity processes. The information frictions for workers in the model are based on the \'Stubborn Beliefs Equilibrium\' of \\cite{menzio} where a subset of workers believe that productivity is constant at the long run average. The subset of workers who are uninformed negotiate a fixed wage contract which makes them lucrative for firms during periods of high productivity. Hence, during periods of high productivity, if the unemployment pool has a larger measure of uninformed workers, there is increased vacancy creation. However, during periods of low productivity, the uninformed worker does not take a wage cut triggering endogenous job destruction. During periods of low aggregate productivity, as more firms choose to separate from workers that have fixed wage contract due to information frictions, the proportion of such workers in the unemployment pool increases. The increase in proportion of uninformed workers in the unemployment pool reduces vacancy creation during low productivity cycle. In a partial equilibrium setup, I show that firms with low productivity prefer to hire workers without information friction, while high productivity firms prefer the workers with information frictions. However, this hiring pattern. makes firms with a higher share of uninformed workers become more vulnerable to productivity downturns while the firms with higher share of informed workers exhibit reduced risk of worker layoffs.